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THE COMING OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION
0. Randolph Rollins*
I. INTRODUCTION
A great debate rages across the ranks of the legal profession
about the need to regulate claims by lawyers that they are special-
ists in particular fields of practice.1 Members of our profession ex-
press outrage when another lawyer lists himself under the anti-
trust or tax headings in the Yellow Pages complaining that that
lawyer calls "them" when he needs anti-trust or tax advice. Law-
yers profess astonishment when they see an advertisement by an-
other attorney cataloguing a number of fields in which that attor-
ney practices. They ask how could any person-much less a lawyer
who advertises-be a "specialist" in so many fields. Having regis-
tered such objections, practitioners then demand that our discipli-
nary rules "do something" about lawyers who so deceive the public
and bring such disrepute to our profession. In short, we ask for
regulation of legal specialization. We say it is needed in order to
serve the public interest.
State bar committees across the country have responded to these
grass roots pleas.2 Through much study and time, they have devel-
* Partner, McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Virginia; B.A. 1965, Duke University;,
J.D., 1968, Duke University. Mr. Rollins is a member of the Virginia State Bar and the
Chairman of the Virginia State Bar Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Specialization.
He also serves as an Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law. This
article is adapted from a speech presented in a Symposium on Legal Ethics at T.C. William
School of Law on November 16, 1984. The article draws substantially from two other works
by the author. Rollins, Why Specialization: Public Interest or Self Interest?, 32 VA. B.
NEws 8 (Aug. 1983); and Memorandum in Support of Petition of The State Bar to Amend
Rules of Court pt. 6, § IV, 16 (submitted to the Virginia Supreme Court in May 1984).
Some material from this article also appears in Rollins, Practice Development in an Age of
Specialization, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 14, col. 1, and March 4, 1985 at 14, col. 1.
1. See generally, Clare, Incompetency and the Responsibility of Courts and Law
Schools, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray. 463 (1976); Esau, Recent Developments in Specialization
Regulation of the Legal Profession, 11 MArrOA L.J. 133 (1981); Mindes, Proliferation,
Specialization and Certification: The Splitting of the Bar, 11 U. ToL L. REv. 273 (1980);
Zinober, Legal Specialization: Its Development in Florida, 57 FLA. B.J. 680 (1983).
2. Fourteen states have adopted some plan for legal specialization. These states include
the following: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. Six states and
the District of Columbia have plans pending before their state supreme courts. These states
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oped and presented plans that would regulate legal specialization.
These proposals range from simple designation plans, under which
lawyers may self-designate their specialties, provided that they cer-
tify they know something about the area, to rigid certification pro-
grams, which require peer review and formal testing before the bar
confers the exalted specialist label.
Yet even the mildest form of proposed regulation meets heart-
felt (perhaps pocketbook-felt) objections. Legal counselors vehe-
mently assert that the regulation of specialization of any type is
but the first step down the slippery slope toward mandatory limits
on the scope of a lawyer's practice, a violation of the time-honored
principle that any lawyer who has passed the bar examination is
competent to handle any legal problem. They contend that the
public "knows" how to find lawyers, particularly in rural areas,
without the benefit of formalized lists of certified specialists, so
why go to the expense and hassle to create a complex and contro-
versial regulatory apparatus.
Opponents of regulation argue, simultaneously, that the stan-
dards required for specialists are "too high" and "too low," so that
those lawyers whom we all would recognize as specialists will not
make the "approved list," and those who are "clearly" not quali-
fied will. Attorneys say that specialization plans benefit particular
segments of the bar, particularly large firms, and exclude others
from many opportunities and economic benefits of the legal profes-
sion. Indeed, they claim the implementation of state-sponsored
specialization will create a public impression that those who can-
not or do not choose to be certified are the "second class citizens"
of the legal profession. In short, neither the public nor the profes-
sion needs a plan to control legal specialization. Such a plan would
be "re-regulation" in an era of deregulation, and may even work
against the public interest.
Behind all this rhetoric, however, significant changes are occur-
ring which are propelling the legal profession toward specialization
whether lawyers like it or not. Advertising by lawyers, permitted
since 1977,1 is moving into a second phase of sophistication and
awareness of marketplace needs, and specialization claims are a
growing part of that advertising. De facto specialization is more
than a flashy trend; it is an established feature of modern law
include the following: Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia.
3. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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practice management. Charges of lawyer incompetence, including
some from high levels of the judiciary, and the resulting public
concern are forcing lawyers everywhere to demonstrate that they
are competent to handle particular problems, and making public
recognition as a specialist the badge of competency. Most impor-
tantly, as a result of price and fee competition, the explosion in the
number of new lawyers, the increasing cost consciousness of cli-
ents, individual and corporate alike, and the adoption of marketing
principles by lawyers, competition among lawyers has intensified.
Specialization has suddenly been discovered as the "competitive
edge" for success.
With forces as strong as these at work, "specialization in fact" is
here to stay. Whether lawyers can or will specialize is not the ques-
tion. Rather, the profession must address how specialization will be
recognized and regulated, and how the public may be protected
from self-proclaimed specialists.
This article explores these issues and takes a close look at the
proposed plan for the certification of specialists in Virginia.4 This
plan, like those being considered and adopted by other states,
seeks to integrate the competing values which are affected by the
advent of "specialization in fact" and serve both the public's and
the profession's interests.
II. EARLY ADVERTISING AND SPECIALIZATION By LAWYERS
Legal specialization and advertising are not recent develop-
ments. Lawyers advertised before the twentieth century, designat-
ing themselves as specialists in certain areas of the law. Abraham
Lincoln advertised as a trial lawyer in the August 10, 1838 San-
gamo Journal:
STUART & LINCOLN, Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, will
practice, conjointly, in the Courts of this Judicial Circuit-Office
No. 4 Hoffman's Row, upstairs. Springfield. 5
4. The Plan for the Certification of Legal Specialists in the Commonwealth of Virginia
(the Plan) was adopted by the Virginia State Bar Council by a vote of 26-25. See Speciali-
zation: The Proposed Plan, 32 VA. B. NEws 9 (Apr. 1984) [hereinafter cited as the Plan].
The Plan is now pending before the Virginia Supreme Court and the Virginia State Bar has
held public hearings around the state on the Plan.
5. See L. ANDREws, BIRTH OF A SALEsMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING & SOLIcrrATION 1 (rev. ed.
1981).
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David Hoffman, a leading spokesman on legal ethics in the nine-
teenth century, advertised in newspapers with endorsements from
the U.S. Secretary of State, the President of the Bank of the
United States, and Chief Justice John Marshall8
It was not until 1908 that the American Bar Association recom-
mended that states prohibit lawyer advertising and solicitation.
Although the ABA permitted professional calling cards, it felt that
a lawyer should acquire legal business through reputation, and not
through public advertising or personal solicitation.8 The organized
bar also made it a punishable ethical violation to offer services at
less than local minimum fee schedules allowed," the admitted pur-
pose being to discourage the performance of legal services for inad-
equate compensation.
III. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF LAWYERS
The legal profession has a reputation for resistance to change,
particularly when it affects lawyers themselves. It is, therefore, not
surprising that initial environmental changes which impelled us to-
ward specialization were not initiated by practitioners themselves.
Rather, they were forced upon the profession by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court's first incursion into the rules governing
lawyers occurred in 1975 in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.10 In
Goldfarb, a government lawyer seeking to purchase a house in
Northern Virginia brought an antitrust challenge against a Virginia
Code of Ethics rule providing that a lawyer could be disciplined for
"habitually" violating a local bar association's minimum fee sched-
ule. Specifically, he challenged Fairfax County's minimum fee for
title searches. Holding that lawyers were not exempt from the
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court struck down minimum fee
6. See Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Mar-
ket Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084, 1085 n.2 (1983).
7. The ABA's 1908 Code of Professional Ethics stated as follows: "[S]olicitation of busi-
ness by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not war-
ranted by personal relations, is unprofessional." See ABA REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST AN-
NUAL MEETING OF THE AMmcAN BAR ASSOCIATION 582 (1908).
8. Id.
9. Former Ethical Canon 12 provided as follows: "[I]t is proper for a lawyer to consider a
schedule of minimum fees adopted by a bar association." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSmiLrrY Canon 12 (1908).
10. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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schedules as "a classic illustration of price fixing.""1
After prohibiting price fixing among lawyers in Goldfarb, the
Court next moved against bar-erected restrictions on public access
to legal services. Relying on Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 2 a case which held that
commercial speech was entitled to first amendment protection, the
Court ruled, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,13 that "a fortiori"
first amendment protection extended to advertising by lawyers. Af-
ter reviewing all the historical and other justifications for the ban
on lawyer advertising, the Court held that the first amendment
permitted lawyers to advertise fees for routine legal services. Ac-
cording to the Court, "Commercial speech serves to inform the
public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and ser-
vices, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system. . . . In short, such speech
serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and
reliable decisionmaking."
4
The Bates Court was careful to point out that advertising which
is false or misleading in any way is not entitled to first amendment
protection, commenting that "[i]ndeed the public and private ben-
efits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accu-
racy and reliability."' 5 Although the Court rejected the argument
that attorney advertising was inherently misleading, it reserved de-
cision on whether states could regulate advertising relating to the
quality of legal services.'6 An advertisement of a speciality is a
quality claim.' 7
The next year, the Court applied its new views concerning the
11. Id. at 783.
12. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court's rationale in Virginia Pharmacy was as follows:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for
what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enter-
prise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those deci-
sions in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765.
13. 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
14. Id. at 364.
15. Id. at 383.
16. Id. at 383-84.
17. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 53 U.S.L.W. 4587, 4591 n.9 (U.S. May
28, 1985).
4831985]
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first amendment in two other lawyer advertising cases, these in-
volving the practice of solicitation, or in-person communications by
attorneys to secure legal work. The Court's rulings in the compan-
ion cases of Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Association"8 and In Re
Primus" can be summarized as follows: The first amendment pro-
tects in-person communication between a lawyer and another per-
son concerning legal services so long as the communication is not
misleading and, under the circumstances, there is not a substantial
likelihood of undue pressure or other influence that would prevent
the potential client from making an informed and dispassionate
decision.20
Further definition of the extent to which the states could regu-
late lawyer advertising came in In re R.M.J.,2 ' a 1982 decision in-
volving the advertising of fields of practice. In striking down Mis-
souri's ethical restrictions against a lawyer's advertisements using
terms other than those included in an approved list to describe his
fields of practice,22 the Supreme Court set forth general principles
applicable to advertising for professional services:
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States
may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially
misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the in-
formation also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive....
Although the potential for deception and confusion is particularly
18. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
19. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
20. Ohralick, 436 U.S. at 465; Primus, 436 U.S. at 435. See also VA. CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL REsPONsmmITY DR 2-103(A), which provides:
Recommendation or Solicitation or Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not, by in-person communication, solicit employment as a pri-
vate practitioner for himself, his partner, or associate or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm from a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding em-
ployment of a lawyer if:
(1) Such communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive
statement or claim; or
(2) Such communication has a substantial potential for or involves the use of coer-
cion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, unwarranted promises of benefits,
overpersuasion, overreaching, or vexatious or harassing conduct, taking into account
the sophistication regarding legal matters, the physical emotional or mental state of
the person to whom the communication is directed and the circumstances in which
the communication is made.
In-person communication means face-to-face communication and telephonic
communication.
21. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
22. Id. at 205. The Missouri State Bar permitted advertising of expertise in areas such as
property and tort law, but not in personal injury and real estate. Id.
[Vol. 19:479
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strong in the context of advertising professional services, restrictions
upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary
to prevent the deception.23
Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on the
advertising of legal specialities, Bates and subsequent cases suggest
that the states may not prohibit specialty advertising if such ad-
vertising is truthful.24 The Court also recognizes, however, that the
states have a substantial interest in narrowly regulating the use of
lawyer specialty advertising to avoid public confusion over the ex-
pertise of attorneys holding themselves out as specialists.25 Indeed,
the Court believes that "it is the Bar's role to assure that the pop-
ulace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place advertising
into proper perspective." 2
IV. CHANGES IN THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT OF LAWYERS
Since the beginning of the "deregulation" of the legal profession
with the Goldfarb decision in 1975, the practice of law has become
increasingly competitive. The number of lawyers almost doubled in
the 1970's and it is estimated that there will be over a million law-
yers in the United States by the middle of the next decade.27 Law-
yer growth appears to outstrip the growth in legal business. There
are signs that more legal work is being performed by non-legal pro-
fessionals and businesses, such as accountants, bankers and tax
preparation services. Simplification of financial transactions, no-
fault insurance, arbitration and similar changes are reducing the
need for related lawyer services. 28 Legal clinics, originally organ-
23. Id. at 203.
24. Virginia has avoided the possibility of infringing on a lawyer's first amendment right
to advertise by deleting disciplinary rule 2-105(A)(3), predecessor to 2-104(A)(2). 2-
105(A)(4) reads as follows:
A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of law or law practice by
the authority having jurisdiction under state law over the subject of specialization by
lawyers may hold himself out as such specialist but only in accordance with the rules
prescribed by that authority.
See, e.g., In re Johnson, 34 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983) (striking down a Minnesota discipli-
nary rule prohibiting specialization advertising, finding that it had a chilling effect on a
lawyer's first amendment right to advertise).
25. Bates, 425 U.S. at 383-84.
26. Id. at 375.
27. See Greene, Lawyers versus the Marketplace, FORBEs 73, 74 (Jan. 16, 1984).
28. Some of these measures were mentioned in a recent newspaper article which discussed
the recommendations of an advisory group to President Reagan on how to cut legal costs.
See Proposals to Reduce Legal Costs Are Due, Richmond Times Dispatch, Jan. 12, 1985, at
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ized to handle common legal problems on an inexpensive, mass ba-
sis, are absorbing work which would otherwise flow to private prac-
titioners and, in some cases, are expanding beyond routine work.
Lawyer competition is also becoming more intense as lawyers
take advantage of relaxed rules on advertising and solicitation.
Some 5,000 law firms recently responded to an ABA survey that
they had tried advertising, ranging from bold-face type for the firm
name in telephone listings to elaborate television spots.29 Many
major law firms now publish brochures and newsletters to provide
persuasive information about themselves to potential clients. In
addition to the time honored golf game and luncheon date, in-
stances of law firm partners soliciting business through cold calls
on corporations are also occurring.
Consumers of legal services are beginning to take advantage of
this vigorous competition, especially with respect to fees. Individu-
als are shopping around to find the lowest fee before engaging a
lawyer. Even in sophisticated fields such as municipal finance, pro-
spective users of legal services are requesting proposals or "bids"
from lawyers before making their selection. So too, cost-conscious
businesses are demanding legal counsel to estimate and justify
costs at the risk of losing the client.3 0
These changes in the competitive environment have forced the
legal profession to become more sensitive to client and public
needs and demands, a generally healthy consequence. Lawyers in
large numbers are studying and, in many cases, implementing mar-
ket research projects and engaging in marketing activities (under
the guise of client education, practice development and similar eu-
phemisms). In essence, lawyers are applying basic business princi-
ples to the legal business, a concept which was considered below
the dignity of the profession as little as five years ago.3 ' The dia-
logue between client and lawyer concerning how the delivery of le-
gal services can be made more efficient occurs more frequently to-
day than ever before.
A central question in any lawyer's response to the demands of
his new environment must be what makes one lawyer stand out
from the lawyers with whom he competes. Not unexpectedly, the
A-11, col. 1.
29. See Names Behind the News, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 16, 1984, at 1.
30. See The Blue Chip Lawyers Discover Marketing, Bus. WK. 89, 94 (Apr. 25, 1983).
31. Id.
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answer is often specialization. This characteristic bears two advan-
tages: (1) it distinguishes one lawyer from another on the basis of
professional expertise, and (2) it justifies legal fees which are
higher, at least on a per-hour basis, than those of the non-special-
ist. Specialization thus becomes a significant competitive edge,
providing powerful economic, as well as professional, impetus to-
ward more de facto specialization in the legal profession and more
advertising (public and personal) which stresses specialization.
V. THE PUBLIC'S NEED FOR LEGAL SPECIALISTS
The growing emphasis by lawyers on specialization does not in
itself establish that the public wants or needs more specialized le-
gal services. Recent surveys and studies have confirmed, however,
that there is a significant public demand for specialization. In
1978, the American Bar Association Special Committee to Survey
Legal Needs issued a report which found that consumer access to
lawyers was often impeded by a lack of information and by appre-
hension about approaching a lawyer."2 The ABA Report also noted
that consumers wanted to hire lawyers who were experienced and
competent in handling their particular types of problems. In other
words, they wanted specialists to handle their legal needs. A 1982
study on lawyer advertising confirmed this, finding that consumers
especially wanted information on a lawyer's qualifications, special
services offered and fees charged. 3
Consumer interest in lawyer specialization meshes perfectly with
the discovery by many lawyers that being known as specialists
gives them a competitive edge. Exercising their new freedom to ad-
vertise, many lawyers have been quick to let the public know of
their expertise and specialties. Lawyers are now listed as specialists
in numerous legal directories such as The American Lawyer Guide
to Leading Law Firms. These client-oriented directories are mark-
edly different in scope from the traditional biographically focused
directories like Martindale-Hubbell.34 Many attorneys have begun
32. See ABA Special Comm. to Survey Legal Needs, Final Report 21 (1978).
33. Patterson & Swerdlow, Should Lawyers Advertise? A Study of Consumer Attitudes,
10 J. AcAD. MARKETING SCL 322 (1982).
34. Recent publications which either expressly or inpiedly list "specialists" include: AM-
LAW PUBLISHING CORP., THE AM&ERicAN LAWYER GUIDE TO LEADING LAW FIRMS 1983-84
(1983); ArToRNEY's NATIONAL CLEARING HOUSE CoMPANY, THE UNITED STATES BAR DIREc-
TORY (1979); ATTORNEY'S NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE COMPANY, THE UNITED STATES BAR REG-
IsTER, 1984 (1984); THE BAR REGISTER COMPANY, INC., THE BAR REGISTER, 1984 (1984); S.
NAIFEN & G. WHITE SMrrH, THE BEST LAWYERS IN AmERCA (1983). The NATIONAL LAW JOUR-
1985]
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to advertise as specialists on radio and television, through newspa-
pers and trade journals, and in telephone books. 5 Telephone direc-
tories with "Guides to Lawyers" sections, listing lawyers by area of
local practice, are no doubt perceived by the public as lists of ac-
knowledged specialities."s Some lawyer groups have gone a step
further, developing their own certification plans for "specialists" in
their particular fields of interest and publicly recognizing those
who meet their standards.3 7
The freedom to advertise has certainly opened the door to infor-
mation about specialists. But the question is how reliable is that
information. In the absence of a state regulatory plan, a lawyer's
statement that he is a specialist is not backed by any "official
seal"; it is merely a self-proclaimed declaration of expertise. There
is no assurance of uniformity among lawyers who claim the same
specialty, and no state-established standard exists against which
deceptive claims of specialization may be judged.
In short, specialization advertising, if deceptive, impedes the
public's comprehension of market conditions concerning legal ser-
vices and their ability to select lawyers knowledgeably. Indeed, it
may give an unfair competitive advantage to those lawyers who ad-
vertise. Given the public's lack of knowledge and sophistication
about legal services, it is doubtful that the free market alone can
correct abuses and prevent damages which are bound to occur.
Just as rules exist protecting free and open competition generally,
so too some regulation is probably necessary to assure that the
marketplace in which specialized legal services are sought and pro-
NAL, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON and Consumers Union also have published or are in the
process of publishing lawyer directories. The latest Martindale-Hubbell questionnaire asks
that lawyers supply information about fields of law to which they devote considerable time.
35. For example, there are 20 pages of lawyer advertisements in the yellow pages of the
current Richmond telephone book. A number of advertisements there make specific claims
of specialization.
36. The yellow pages of the Richmond telephone book for 1984 devotes eight pages to a
Guide to Lawyers section, which is grouped by areas of practice. There is a disclaimer at the
top of each page which states: "Lawyers listed are willing to accept employment in the areas
shown. These listings do not imply that they have limited their practices or are certified as
specialists in these fields." Notwithstanding this statement, many persons who use the Yel-
low Pages to search for a lawyer may believe that persons listed under "Wills, Estates and
Trusts," for example, are specialists in that field. See Zimmerman v. Office of Grievance
Committees, 79 A.D.2d 263, -, 438 N.Y. S. 2d 400, 402 (1981) (holding that in spite of a
similar disclaimer, the public may be left "the erroneous impression that some lawyers...
are certified as specialists or that certification is available."
37. One national group of lawyers, the National Board of Trial Advocacy, does offer a
certification plan in both civil and criminal law.
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vided is allowed to work properly.
VI. THE VALUE OF STATE-REGULATED SPECIALIZATION
It is clear that the Supreme Court has left room under the first
amendment for state regulation of lawyer specialization. In fact,
the Court has suggested that the Bar bears a special responsibility
to assure "that advertising by attorneys flows both freely and
cleanly. '3 8 In this writer's opinion, state regulation of legal special-
ization and how it is advertised can represent a significant step
toward meeting this public responsibility.39
A. Establishing a Uniform Definition of "Specialist"
The single most important contribution by a state-approved
plan of specialization toward assuring that information about spe-
cialists is reliable and not deceptive or misleading, is the establish-
ment of a uniform definition of a "specialist." Within the existing
regulatory framework of the legal profession, the states, through
their supreme courts and state bars, are the only effective institu-
tions which can execute this function.
Through the agency of its integrated state bar, each state su-
preme court has an apparatus in place through which to develop a
uniform, even-handed plan which can define "specialization."
State bars are representative of the entire profession and of com-
munities throughout the states. They have as their basic purpose
the furtherance of the public interest.40 The state bars are under
the supervision of their supreme courts, which require that due
process and public hearings be a part of the plan adoption process.
No other interested group or agency is in a position to authorita-
38. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 384 (1977). See also supra note 23 and accompanying
text.
39. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed regulations for attorney advertis-
ing. The FTC in a 172-page report found that advertising and stiffer competition would lead
to lower legal fees. See Improving Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case for Remov-
ing Restriction on Truthful Advertising, FTC Staff Report, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No.
680, at 7 (Dec. 11, 1984). In a related development, the Justice Department recently
dropped an investigation of the anti-competitive effects of the ABA's rules on reasonable
fees. See Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1985, at 7, col. 2.
40. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Scope & Correlation of Bar Activities, FORTY-
THmD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR 74, 75 (1981) which reads: "Actions or
statements by the Virginia State Bar shall be taken only when the activity ... has as a
substantial purpose and effect the promotion of the public interest as opposed to being
solely in the interest of the Bar or some segment thereof."
1985]
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tively state the requirements of a specialists.41
Virginia's proposed plan of specialization defines lawyer special-
ists as "lawyers who have demonstrated excellence, defined as a
high level of knowledge, skill and proficiency, in a specific field of
law."' 42 To give this phrase specific content, the plan then estab-
lishes minimum standards for the certification of any lawyer as a
specialist. As with all specialization plans, Virginia's minimum
standards involve a balancing of competing values. Obviously, the
standards must be sufficiently rigorous to justify public confidence
that certified specialists have in fact achieved a high level of excel-
lence in their designated fields. Yet the plan cannot be expected to
fulfill one of its principal purposes-to provide greater public ac-
cess to specialized legal services-unless adequate numbers of at-
torneys can, and will, meet the standards and become certified.
The principal criteria for certification under the Virginia plan
are as follows:
1. Substantial practice in the specialty for five years.4' Requir-
ing five years of experience recognizes the axiom that actual legal
experience over an extended period of time is absolutely essential
for a specialist. While any choice of number of years is somewhat
arbitrary, the five-year benchmark is more rigorous than some
plans, including the ABA's, yet not so burdensome so as to dis-
courage applications from younger practitioners.
"Substantial involvement" in the specialty is the plan's primary
measure of whether the specialist has had the number and types of
experiences on a regular basis needed to achieve a high level of
knowledge, skill and proficiency in the field.44 The actual measure
of substantial involvement may vary from specialty to specialty. In
recognition of the differences among specialties, the substantial in-
41. A bar-sponsored plan will also encourage vertical uniformity among other "certifying"
organizations and thereby avoid the confusion which will result if, for example, two associa-
tions of criminal lawyers "certify" specialists under differing standards. The bar, with its
broader base and its public interest obligations, is better suited to deal with this issue than
other organizations advancing narrower trade-oriented interests. Other organizations which
"certify" specialty practices will by necessity conform to at least the stated minimum levels
of competency.
42. See The Plan, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 9. The Plan places more emphasis on excellence
in a specialist than does the ABA plan. For example, it would require a lawyer to spend
more of his time in his specialty and to have practiced in the specialty area for a longer
period of time than does the ABA.
43. See The Plan, supra note 4, § 7.2.
44. Id.
490 [Vol. 19:479
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volvement requirement may be met by the number or types of
matters handled, by time alone or by a combination of these.45 If it
is measured by time alone, the lawyer must spend at least one-
third of his total practice in the specialty.46 This percentage is
higher than the ABA recommendation, but for flexibility the time
criteria may be combined with other measures. For example, a law-
yer who devotes only twenty percent of his time to the specialty
may meet the "substantial involvement" test if he can otherwise
show that the volume or complexity of his case experience, along
with time, demonstrate substantial involvement.
2. Participation in an average of fifteen hours of continuing le-
gal education per year over a five-year period.4 7 Regular continu-
ing legal education in the specialty provides assurance that the
specialist stays abreast of current developments in his field. Fur-
thermore, satisfying this requirement over a five-year period is
strong evidence of the lawyer's commitment to the specialty. The
plan's selection of the number of hours, the period over which the
average is measured, and the courses or their equivalent which
count toward satisfaction reflect judgments made based on course
availability, cost, and content, again on a balancing of values basis.
3. Confirmation by others. The Virginia plan requires that any
application for specialist certification be supported by affidavits
from professionals who are familiar with the work of the appli-
cant. 8 This requirement provides independent verification that
the lawyer meets standards of involvement and excellence in the
specialty, and is known in the community for such expertise.
4. Written work product.4 9 A lawyer's stock in trade is his writ-
ten product-the opinion, the brief, the memorandum, the con-
tract. Therefore, the Virginia plan requires applicants to submit a
written work product substantially prepared by themselves.50 This
provides tangible evidence of whether the applicant has the level
of knowledge, skill and proficiency required of a specialist.
5. Additional standards, including examinations. Under the
Virginia plan, additional or more stringent standards for particular
45. Id.
46. Id. § 7.2(c).
47. Id. § 7.3.
48. Id. § 7.4.
49. Id. § 7.5.
50. Id.
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specialities may be adopted to define or quantify the minimum re-
quirements.5 1 This allows the standards to be tailored to the na-
ture of each specialty and to reflect changing needs over time.
Virginia's plan does not include a mandatory examination re-
quirement as a part of the minimum standards for certification.
However, it permits such a requirement to be added for specialties
for which it is appropriate. 2 While it is true that an examination
can significantly aid the determination of an applicant's knowl-
edge, skill and proficiency, competency testing is difficult and ex-
pensive to administer, and may not be an appropriate measure of
expertise in every field. Mandatory testing may also deter large
numbers of otherwise qualified lawyers, who thought the bar exam
was their last test, from seeking certification, thereby defeating
other public access goals of the plan. Doubts about the fairness of
test questions and grading of individual tests can also undermine
the larger objectives of public confidence in those who are
certified. 53
B. Other Uses of the Definition of Specialist
Once a definitional standard for specialization is established, it
is possible for lawyers, the public and enforcement agencies to de-
termine, by comparison, whether a particular specialization claim
is true, or false and misleading. First, a plan of specialization, with
its minimum standards, will provide needed guidance to individual
lawyers who tell clients and prospective clients that they "special-
ize." Since most lawyers will voluntarily abide by the definition of
specialist, once they are told through the plan what the definition
is, they will refrain from claiming to be specialists if they have not
met the plan's requirements. Alternatively, they may seek certifi-
cation so as to come within the safe harbor of the plan and adver-
tise their specialist status without fear of violating the disciplinary
rules.
Second, the public itself will be better able to identify and en-
gage lawyers who are qualified for particular tasks. It should be
easy for consumers to find out which members of the bar are certi-
fied under a state plan in appropriate fields, since it is fair to as-
51. Id. § 9.
52. Id.
53. See 1983 ABA STANDING COMMITrEE ON SPECIALIZATION, HANDBOOK ON SPECIALIZATION
32 (1983).
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sume that lawyers who are certified will let that fact be known in
telephone directories, listings and advertisements. 4 Even in choos-
ing a non-certified lawyer, the public will have a checklist, in the
form of the minimum specialization standards, to help in the deci-
sion process.
Third, enforcement agencies-the bars and the courts-will have
a well considered standard of reference, in the form of specializa-
tion criteria, by which to judge whether a specialization advertise-
ment is misleading. Thus, decisions to prosecute for deceptive ad-
vertising will be guided and supported by the certainty of an
objective standard. It is true that an attorney could prove that he
is a specialist in a particular case even though he does not meet the
minimum requirements of the plan and therefore establish that his
advertisement is not misleading. Nevertheless, a state standard for
certification of legal specialists-developed and administered
under the supervision of the bar and the courts-will in all
probability be accorded great weight in establishing an essential
element of a deceptive advertising charge. For instance, when a
lawyer's advertisement states that he is a bankruptcy specialist, his
experience and training can be matched up against the standards
for bankruptcy certification. If he comes up short and does not in-
dependently demonstrate that he has the skills of or is recognized
as a bankruptcy specialist, then he probably will be found to have
made a false and misleading statement, in violation of the discipli-
nary rules. In this way, prosecution of an advertising case becomes
much more fact oriented, obviating the need to prove in each case
the legal standard of specialization.
C. Regulating the Advertising of Specialization.
A state-sponsored plan of specialization gives the states and the
legal profession a renewed opportunity to prevent the public from
suffering harm from false or deceptive advertising of specialties.
While the United States Supreme Court has yet to define what
constitutes a "misleading" statement within the context of profes-
sional advertising, the Court has furnished important guidance as
54. Increased public awareness of these standards will engender greater public confidence
in and reliance on lawyers who make it known that they are Board Certified Specialists. As
this happens, it can be expected that the yellow pages and other publications will replace
their current guides and lists with Bar-approved specialty information. It also seems likely
that a lawyer who is certified could so indicate in the current yellow page guides with initials
like "B.C.S." (Board Certified Specialist) after his or her name.
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to the appropriate standard with the comment in Bates that: "The
determination whether an advertisement is misleading requires
consideration of the legal sophistication of its audience. Thus, dif-
ferent degrees of regulation may be appropriate in different
areas."
55
The Court's reference to the Feil case confirms that the normal
practice employed by agencies such as the Federal Trade Commis-
sion-that what is "misleading" should be measured in the eye of
the beholder-should be applied in lawyer advertising cases as
well. In Feil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit focused its attention on the meaning of the advertisement
as it was likely to be construed by the intended audience: "[T]hese
representations are not made to experts in the field, but to the
laity who may not be capable of discerning their misleading char-
acter."56 Perhaps the Supreme Court had reference to this when it
stated in Bates, "If the naivete of the public will cause advertising
by attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar's role to assure
that the populace is sufficiently informed as to enable it to place
advertising in its proper perspective. 57
Furthermore, the Bates Court's emphasis on "different degrees
of regulation" seems especially pointed toward the public's likely
reception of specialization claims. The danger inherent in unquali-
fied claims of lawyer specialization is not merely the lack of any
popular understanding of the term "specialist" as applied to the
practice of law, but more specifically that the term "specialist"
may create a false sense of reliability when applied to law. This
perception arises from the fact that the most common experience
with specialists is in the context of the medical profession. When
describing medical specialists, the term implies special credentials,
education and training, and in many cases testing and actual resi-
dency experience. Until specialists in law must meet similar, rigor-
ous standards, it is manifestly false, fraudulent and a breach of the
public trust to use words such as "specialist" and "expert" without
substantiation.
Moreover, if a non-certified attorney is permitted to advertise
that he or she is a specialist without disclosing a lack of certifica-
55. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 n.37 (citations omitted).
56. 285 F.2d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 1960). The Court has placed great emphasis on the work of
the FTC in determining whether an advertisement is false or misleading. See Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 53 U.S.L.W. 4587, 4592-94 (U.S. May 28, 1985).
57. 433 U.S. at 375.
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tion, the public will be misled. After viewing such advertising, the
consumer seeking information will remain uninformed as to what
he thought he was learning. What is more harmful, the consumer
may actually be misinformed and may select an attorney who
would not otherwise be employed.58
The Supreme Court in In Re R.M.J 9 noted the "special pos-
sibilities for deception"60 presented by attorney advertising. How-
ever, the states were cautioned that restrictions on lawyer advertis-
ing should be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent
deception: "[T]he remedy in the first instance is not necessarily a
prohibition but preferably a requirement of disclaimers or
explanation. '6 1
The Virginia plan, along with Virginia's "false and deceptive"
disciplinary rules on advertising,62 implement all of these constitu-
tional and public interest imperatives. Lawyers who are certified as
specialists are permitted to advertise that they are "Board Certi-
fied Specialists" in their particular specialties, and such statement
is deemed to be in compliance with the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. 3 On the other hand, lawyers who advertise that they
are specialists and who have not been certified under the plan
must meet two requirements to avoid challenge: (1) disclose lack of
certification under the plan by stating either that he or she is not
certified, or that the advertised specialty has not been designated
under the plan; and (2) establish that such communication con-
cerning the speciality is not false, fraudulent, misleading or
deceptive. 4
VII. EFFECTS OF REGULATION OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION
Specialization in fact has become a fixture in the competitive en-
vironment of lawyers. Whether the legal profession likes it or not,
58. See Fell, 285 F.2d at 887. See also Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434 So.2d 732 (Ala.
1983) (upholding Alabama's disclaimer as constitutional).
59. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 201 (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)).
61. Id. at 203. Further, the Court held that "the bar could require disclaimers or explana-
tions to avoid false hopes." Id. at 200 n.11.
62. See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmmITY DR 2-101, DR 2-103 (1983). DR 2-101
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in any public communication which is false, fraudulent,
misleading or deceptive; DR 2-103 contains a similar standard for in-person communication.
63. The Plan, supra note 4, § 6.7. This method received further support in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 53 U.S.L.W. 4587, 4595 (U.S. May 28, 1985).
64. Id.
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specialization is rapidly changing the practice of law. Its unguided
growth, however, could well prove harmful to both the profession
and the public it serves.
How the regulation by the states of legal specialization under
plans such as proposed for Virginia will serve the public interest
may be summarized as follows:
1. It will provide to members of the public greater access to the
legal services which they need through reliable information about
specialists.
2. It will diminish the danger of the public being misled or
deceived by unregulated specialty advertising.
3. It will encourage lawyers to achieve higher standards of lawyer
excellence as a condition to being certified and allowed to hold
themselves out as specialists.
Without question, state plans of specialization will have
profound effects on the legal profession. They will legitimize the
concept that a specialist is somehow different from a general prac-
titioner. They will challenge the tenet that all who pass the bar
exam are equally equipped to handle all different types of legal
problems. They will introduce an element of regulation to which
lawyers have not in the past been accustomed.
Admittedly, a plan of specialization will create a new public dis-
tinction between lawyers who are certified as specialists and those
who are not. Yet is the public not entitled to know which members
of the bar have the interest to develop and have demonstrated the
qualifications to be certified? Are the people not entitled to know
that certification is granted by a governmental agency required to
observe rules of due process and to confer specialist titles only in
the public's interest?65
In the final analysis, adoption by a state of a plan of specializa-
tion represents a public policy decision to protect and promote
these important values.6 So long as certification is not designed
65. The Board's petition for designation of a specialty, and ultimately the Court's deci-
sion on that petition, must meet high standards of public interest. The Plan, supra note 4, §
3.2. Factors to be taken into account include the public's need for reliable information about
and access to lawyers in a specialty, the potential for devising objective standards of excel-
lence for the specialty, and the promotion of orderly growth of specialties in the state.
66. Virginia's Plan is voluntary, permitting a lawyer to practice in a specialty area and to
truthfully advertise that he or she is a specialist. See The Plan, supra note 4, § 6.4. More-
over, certified specialists are not limited to practice in their areas. Id. § 6.1. Even though a
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for the benefit of any particular segment of the bar, but for the
public's interest, and so long as it will allow any lawyer who dedi-
cates himself to being expert in his field to become certified, 67 then
a plan of specialization will fulfill both the first amendment princi-
ples and public interest purposes of Bates and RMJ.
The coming of specialization means change and readjustment for
both the public and the legal profession. Let the profession begin
to regain some of the professionalism and stature it has lost over
the past decade by responding and changing with it. But let law-
yers also remember that the public trust which they hold requires
them to guide these changes in the direction which serves the pub-
lic interest.
lawyer in a firm is a certified specialist, this standard is not attributable to the firm as a
whole. Id. § 6.3. Also, in referral situations specialists are encouraged not to take additional
work from a client. Id. § 6.6. These provisions seek to keep the status quo of current attor-
ney-client relationships, while at the same time making better expert service available to the
public.
67. There is only one minimum standard-that of substantial involvement in the spe-
cialty, The Plan, supra note 4, § 7.2-which some lawyers will not be able to meet. Some
practitioners say that they are not able sufficiently to concentrate their practices so as to
qualify as specialists under the Plan, and still meet the legal needs of their communities or
make an adequate living. It is unfortunate that lawyers in these circumstances will not be
able to seek certification but this fact does not reduce the great public need for a plan of
specialization. Reduction of the minimum standard for substantial involvement so as to al-
low every lawyer to qualify would "devalue the coin" and make certification meaningless.

